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In order to establish trust among nodes in large wireless networks, the trust cer-
tificates need to be distributed and be readily accessible. However, even so, searching
for trust certificates can be delayed and costly especially when wireless network is
under CTS jamming attack, in which the attacker jams the reception of a control
packet termed clear-to-send, CTS. We believe the individual solution can lead us to
solve the combined problem. Therefore, in this work, we investigate the delay and
cost of searching a distributed certificate and the adverse effects of fabricated control
packet attacks on channel throughput and delivery ratio respectively, and propose
two techniques that can improve the efficiency of searching for such certificates in the
network and mitigate the CTS jamming attack’s effect. Evidence Distribution based
on Periodic Broadcast (EDPB) is the first solution we present to help node to quickly
locate trust certificates in a large wireless sensor network. In this solution, nodes
carrying certificates periodically announce their existence. Such announcements, to-
gether with a swarm-intelligence pheromone update procedure, will leave traces on
the nodes to lead query packets toward the certificate nodes. We then investigate the
salient features of this schema and evaluate its performance in both static and mobile
networks. This schema can also be used for other essential information dissemination
in mobile ad hoc networks. The second technique, address inspection schema (AIS)
addresses vulnerabilities in distribution coordinating function (DCF) defined in IEEE
802.11 standard. The AIS scheme allows nodes to detect the CTS jamming attack
and mitigates its adverse effect. We then perform ns-2 simulations to evaluate the
benefit of AIS.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Wireless Communication Network
Wireless Communication Network technologies are dramatically making progress
in recent years because of their significant advantages of productivity and convenience.
The major goal of wireless communication network is now to allow a user to have ac-
cess to the capabilities of global networks at any time without regard to location or
mobility. There are four categories of wireless communication network: cellular wire-
less networks, wireless local area networks (WLAN), Ultra-wideband (UWB), and ad
hoc and sensor networks. Cellular systems have experienced exponential growth over
the last decade and cellular phones have already become essential part of people’s
daily life in most parts of the world. Now, cellular system evolves into the three gen-
eration (3G) and beyond technique which provides people easy and quick accessibility
to online resources at any location or time. In addition, WLAN is replacing wired
networks in many homes, businesses, and campuses. However, many technical chal-
lenges, for example, security, remain in designing robust wireless networks. Security
mechanisms are essential to protect data integrity and confidentiality, access control,
authentication, quality of service, user privacy, and continuity of service which are
also critical to protect basic wireless network functionality.
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1.2 Wireless Sensor Network
With the advances in micro-electro-mechanical systems (MEMS) technology which
enables the development of sensor node, wireless sensor network has gained popular-
ity in recent years. These sensor nodes are small in size and have limited computing
speed and memory size. In addition, they are equipped with transceiver unit which
allows them to communicate with each other peers within a certain distance and
sensor units that can sense, measure, and gather information from the environment.
A wireless sensor network (WSN) is composed of a large number of sensor nodes
which are pre-deployed so that they can collaborate with each other to perform cer-
tain functionalities. There are two categories of WSN, structured and unstructured
[51]. Unstructured WSN is the one that a collection of sensor nodes are in random
deployment, that requires network protocol and algorithm can process self-organizing
capabilities. For a structured WSN in which sensor nodes are deployed in a pre-
planned manner, fewer sensor nodes are needed since the position of each node is
carefully designed. Both of them have common characteristics, infra-structureless
which does not require pre-deployed infrastructures such as base-stations and central
control.
Due to significant research and development effort in past few years, a wide variety
of applications are built on WSN which are able to monitor a wide range of ambient
conditions such as object movement, temperature, humidity, lighting, and noise level
etc.[3]. Example of these WSN applications include:
• Battle surveillance ( e.g. friendly forces, equipment and ammunition tracking)
• Environmental monitoring (e.g. Forest fire and flood detection)
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• Health diagnostics (e.g. Telemonitoring of human physiological data)
• Home monitoring (e.g. Home automation )
• Other applications (e.g. Vehicle tracking and detection )
1.3 Security Issues in Large Wireless Networks
While a wide range of WSN applications serving in civilian, industrial, and mili-
tary areas, they are exposing security and privacy issues since every sensor node that
locates at a accessible deployment area becomes potential attack point and easily
suffers either physical or logic attacks. More specifically, these potential attacks can
be categorized as follows [27], common attacks, denial of service (DoS) attack, node
compromise, impersonation attack, and protocol-specific attacks.
Because of open access characteristic of wireless communication, there are some
specific attacks aim at communication channels. An adversary can easily gain access
to private or sensitive information by monitoring transmitted packets between nodes
(Eavesdropping). Intruder can capture compromise sensor nodes to attack WSN by
intercept messages and then modify the messages’ content (Message Modification) or
by sending a fault-data packet resembling a legitimate packet (Message Injection).
A malicious node can launch DoS attack by using hardware failures, software bugs,
or any conditions. A DoS attack on WSN may take several forms: node collabo-
ration, in which a group of malicious nodes acts purposely to prevent information
from reaching certain regions of network; jamming attack, in which attacker occupy
communication channel to prohibit nodes in certain areas from sending or receiving
packets; exhaustion of power, in which an attacker repeatedly communicate with vic-
tim node to exhaust their power. The classic example of Impersonation attack, in
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which node illegitimately claims multiple identities, is Sybil attack. Internal protocols
such as routing and IEEE 801.11 standard used in WSN are facing threats by sub-
verted nodes which adopt complex attacking strategies. Any of attacking strategies
falls into one following categories [20]: Spoofed Routing information which is used to
corrupt routing table information, Selective Forwarding in which malicious node se-
lectively drops certain packets and forwards some packets without raising suspicions,
Wormhole Attack in which information captured in one location is sent to another lo-
cation to replay it through wormhole link, Hello Flood Attack in which fake HELLO
packet broadcasted during the deployment of network, Acknowledgement Spoofing
creates false acknowledgement message.
Information Privacy
With more and more critical information delivered on these wireless networks, an
adversary can easily gain access to sensitive information communicated between two
nodes due to the nature of wireless communication. Usually, wireless networks would
employ asymmetric key scheme to guard the information privacy. In asymmetric key
scheme, there are two kinds of keys in network, private key and public key. The
public keys are ready to accessible for all nodes in network, and the private key is
kept secretly by the node itself. In oder to protect the confidentiality and integrity of
message, node (sender) should encrypt message using public keys of receiver that will
then decrypt message using its own private key. Normally, to avoid been intercepted
by adversary, the public keys are released by trusted third party, certificate authority
(CA) which will issue certificates for nodes to perform public key authentication.
Each certificate, signed by the CA, contains a public key and the identifier of a
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node. Each of the nodes only needs to carry the public key of the CA and authenticate
the certificate of the public key. However, due to constraint of memory size and CPU
speed, the unique CA in WSN could be a bottleneck, therefore, multiple certificate
copies are placed randomly in the network. When a node needs to verify a public
key, it will query its neighborhood for a certificate copy. This process may occur
frequently in the network as moving/joining nodes try to authenticate each other.
Therefore, the query complexity and cost for a certificate copy should be as low as
possible.
Many techniques allow nodes to search for certificate copies. For example, a
Time-To-Live (TTL) based flooding can be used, but this has been found to cause
the broadcast storm problem [29]. In [17], a swarm-intelligence based scheme termed
Ant-Based Evidence Distribution (ABED) was proposed. In ABED, query packets
are treated as ants looking for food source. Reply packets with certificate copy are
considered as ants returning with food. These packets (ants) leave traces for other
querying packets (ants) to find the certificate copy (food source). As we will demon-
strate in this work, such an approach does not work well in mobile and dynamic
networks because traces can become invalid quickly.
Vulnerabilities In IEEE 802.11 Standard
As WSN applications performed desired operations and functions for its intended
use, defending against Denial-of-Service (DoS) attack, which aims to disrupt network
functionalities rather than steal sensitive information, become significant. One of
prominent DoS attacks is deviating from IEEE 802.11 standard protocol [1] which
employs distribution coordinating function (DCF) technique to coordinates medium
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access for contending nodes. DCF is in fact the carrier sense multiple access with colli-
sion avoidance (CSMA/CA) schema which employs RTS/CTS mechanism to combat
the hidden/exposed terminal problems. In this scheme, communication goes through
a sequence of control/data packet dialogues: Request-To-Send (RTS) packet, Clear-
To-Send (CTS) packet, Data (DATA) packet, and Acknowledgement (ACK) packet.
DCF allows different nodes in the network to have fair shares of the medium usage.
In order to avoid collisions by packet transmissions from different nodes at various
locations, a special field termed Network Allocation Vector (NAV) is included in RTS,
CTS, and ACK packets. After receiving the NAV values on these control packets,
nodes can only use the channel after the NAV timer expired. While this technique
works well in allowing nodes to reserve the channel, it also opens the door to malicious
attackers or selfish nodes in the network to gain unfair access or prohibit other nodes
from accessing the channel.
Researchers have identified several weaknesses that might be exploited by an at-
tacker or a selfish user in the network. For example, a selfish node may choose a
small interval time in the back-off procedure [32] or delaying SIFS (Short Inter Frame
Spacing) interval time instead of DIFS (Distributed Inter Frame Spacing) between the
process of exchanging frames [36]. This would always give the attacker itself a bet-
ter chance of successful channel reservation. Similarly, it may also achieve the same
goal by sending out fabricated control packets to interfere with other nodes . This is
sometimes termed intelligent jamming [23,31], as compared to physical jamming [49].
Compared to jamming detection [42, 50] at the physical layer, detection of in-
telligent jamming is more challenging. Such jammings consume less energy for the
attacker while achieving a similar result - denying all other nodes’ access to the chan-
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nel. Due to the lack of proper data-link layer authentication techniques, any node
in network could send out control packets such as RTS, CTS, and ACK. With these
packets, it could dominate the channel by assigning an arbitrarily large value of NAV.
Fabricated RTS attacks can be detected as nodes can sense the status of the channel
for the data packet transmission with a longer carrier sensing range, or lower sensing
threshold [53]. Fabricated CTS or ACK attacks are more subtle. Among others,
one difficulty of detecting such attacks is that these control packets do not carry the
packet sender’s ID [1].
Problem Setting
We consider the setting where a large number of sensors are deployed in an IEEE
802.11 wireless network and a number of certificate copies are randomly distributed
in network to avoid failure work of CA caused by malicious attack. All the sensors
collaborate together to perform certain tasks, which require highly safety and robust.
To guarantee information transmitted over network is safety, node can not communi-
cate with other node until they obtain the certificate of other node which significantly
increases network overhead. Besides, there are a few undetected sensor nodes ran-
domly distributed in network which violate with IEEE 802.11 standard and send out
spoof control packets periodically that subsequently block certain region’s traffic.
Goals and Restrictions
In recapitulation, let us state our goals for this thesis in a concise form:
• Design a technique that allow any node can efficiently locate the certificate.
• Propose a solution to detect jamming attacks and recover network throughput
On the flipside we have established some restrictions to make this thesis feasible:
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• We only consider there is one malicious node in network.
• Our solution is designed only to detect CTS jamming attack.
1.4 Document Organization
The following paper is divided into four chapters followed by the references.
• Chapter II introduces the related work.
• Chapter III explains our schema and solution in detail.
• Chapter IV shows the simulations results to evaluate our work.
• Chapter V summarizes our work and discuss future works.
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CHAPTER II
RELATED WORK
Our work is mostly related to swarm intelligence applied on routing design, dis-
tributed evidence management and protection from jamming attack on MAC layer.
In this chapter, we discuss several related work in the following.
2.1 Routing Protocol Design with Swarm Intelligence
Swarm intelligence (SI) [21] is the property of a decentralized, self-organized sys-
tem in which individual behavior arising from agent’s interaction with its environment
causes a group of agents to act as cohesively and highly self-organized. SI is often
observed in nature, including ant colonies and bee swarming etc. In 1985, Craig
Reynolds [38] proposed a flocking model that models coordinated animal motion
such as bird flocks and fish schools. The generic simulated flocking creature is called
boid and there are three simple steering behaviors that describe how an individual
boid maneuvers based on the positions and velocities of its neighboring boids, namely
separation, alignment, and cohesion. The separation behavior steers a boid to avoid
crowding its local flockmates. The alignment behavior steers a boid towards the av-
erage heading of its local flockmates. The cohesion behavior steers a boid to move
toward the average position of its local flockmates. These three steering behaviors, us-
ing information sensed only from other nearby boids, allowed flockmates to behavior
cohesively.
Inspired by SI, a lot of research are devoted to design adaptive, decentralized,
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flexible and robust artificial systems in the past years. Research on ant-colony based
swarm intelligence has been developed and often used in dynamic optimization prob-
lems, such as energy saving and routing optimization in WSN. The power of such
an approach for routing optimization can be explained below: consider how a cer-
tain ant species find the shortest path to food source merely by laying and following
pheromone on trials. In a simple case, ants starting from nest to search for food
would leave pheromone on trials. While some trials go nowhere, others lead them to
food sources especially when the ants come back with food. Other ants follow (or
are attracted by) these pheromones on the trails. Based on this observation, three
categories routing protocols in WSN, unicast, multicast, and anycast are investigated.
Ant-Colony-Based Routing Algorithm (ARA) [13] is the classical example of ant-
based swarm intelligence unicast routing protocol. This protocol consists of three
main phases, namely route discovery, route maintenance, and route failure handling.
During routing discovery phase, forward ant (FANT) is boradcasted by the sender and
will be relayed by intermediated nodes to exploring potential new route to destina-
tion and establishing the pheromone track to the sender and subsequently, backward
ant (BANT) is released by destination to establish pheromone trace to the destina-
tion. Routes are maintained by subsequent data packets which are transmitted over
network. Pheromone values are updated by reinforce rule in order to strength path.
Meanwhile, pheromone behaviored like what it does in nature, its value is decreased
by the time goes on. Routing failure, usually caused by node’s mobility, is detected
by lost acknowledgement. Building upon ant-colony based dynamic routing proto-
cols, Garcia and Pedraza [12] proposed a rational swarm (SWARM) routing protocol
which is able to pick up best route (less latency and good quality) among multiple
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routes and achieves good network load balancing. Jiang and Baras [17] adapt this
ant-based algorithm to distribute trust evidence management in ad hoc networks. In
their approach, query messages are considered as forward ants that may be broad-
casted or unicasted. The return information are considered backward ants that leave
traces for future forward ants to follow. However, communication cost and latency
are high in their approach because many forward ants are likely to be broadcasted
(flooded) in the neighborhood. Furthermore, complicated reinforcement rule can lead
to trial loops in mobile networks, effectively eliminating the benefits of such traces.
To overcome overhead problem of unicast routing, Jeon and Kesidis [16] presented
an ant-based multipath routing protocol that jointly manage both energy and latency
concerns in a volatile networking context. Their approach operates similar manner to
ARA, but with two exceptions. The first one is instead of discard duplicated FANTs,
intermediate nodes relayed duplicated FANTs to build multiple routes from source to
destination. Another one is pheromone level values are updated by energy and delay
metrics rather than positive and negative feedback. Shen and Jaikaeo [41] proposed
a novel multicast routing protocol for mobile ad hoc networks, Multicast for Ad Hoc
Networks with Swarm Intelligence (MANSI), to establish multicast connectivity. In
their schema, initial forwarding set, usually not optimized, will evolves into states
that yield lower cost during the lifetime of the multicast session by deploying forward
ant packet which is periodically sent out by non-core member and acts like an ant in
real world to opportunistically explore different better paths to core.
Anycast routing protocol using swarm intelligence (ARPSI) is proposed by Hoh et
al. [8] to route packets dynamically to a nearby server with low overhead in a mobile,
ad hoc, wireless network by applying the behavior of the real ant colonies. Routing
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discovery and route maintenance are two phases of this system. During routing
discovery phase, multiple paths from mobile node to anycast servers are established
by exchanging QUERY and REPLY packets in which pheromone is laid on the path,
so that anycast packets are efficiently routed to destination according to pheromone
intensity. In route maintenance phase, EXPLORE packets are periodically sent to
anycast server to monitor quality of existing routes and to explore new route.
To address power consumption issue in WSN, Shen et al. [40] proposed Ant-
Based Topology Control (ABTC) algorithm to minimize the maximum power used
by any node in network or minimize the total power used by all of the nodes in
the network, while maintaining network connectivity. Their algorithm adapts the
biological metaphor of swarm intelligence as a heuristic search mechanism and each
node in network search a proper transmit power by collecting local information from
its neighbors. In addition, Load Balancing and Energy ware ARAMA (LBE-ARAMA)
routing [34] attempts to solve both energy saving and traffic load balancing issues
by adopting different metrics and global and local parameters in their computation
model.
Not only ant colonies behavior’s principles are adopted in current research, other
swarms’ behavior such as honey bees are also investigated by researchers to solve
real problems. BeeHive [47] is a routing protocol that achieves fault tolerant, scal-
ability, and robust based on inspiration of communicative and evaluative methods
and procedures of honey bees. Unlike Ant-based algorithm, this approach eliminates
any global information such as topology structure and cost of links among routers,
and global clock synchronization by working with local information which is collected
by bee agent travels in a foraging zone. Based on swarm intelligence, specifically
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on honey bee colony, BeeAdHoc [46] is proposed as a novel routing protocol which
mainly considers the power consumption concern. Two main types of packets, Scout
and Forager are designed in this approach. Scout is used to discovery new routes on
demand whereas Forger evaluates the quality of existing routes by transporting data
packets from source to destination. This simplicity results in substantially smaller
number of control packets sent, furthermore, the power consumption of network is
optimized.
2.2 Evidence management in distributed environment
Efficient security mechanisms in distributed environment for trust management
have been investigated through different perspectives since traditional security mech-
anisms for confidentiality and authentication cannot be employed directly. Abdul-
Rahman and Hailes [2] proposed a distributed trust model with explicit trust state-
ment to reduce ambiguity and recommended a protocol to exchange trust-related
information. Zhou and Haas [54] introduced a key management scheme that distribu-
tively assigns trust and shares keys in a set of nodes to solve the vulnerability problem
of a single CA in ad hoc networks. Capkun et al. [9] proposed a self-organizing public-
key management system that allows users to fully control the security settings of the
system without the help of any trusted authority or fixed server.
Ren et al. [37] proposed a reliable trust establishment scheme that uses secret
dealer to construct trust relationship in the system bootstrapping phase. Then they
adopted a fully self-organized trust establishment approach. A chained of peer nodes
were used to bootstrap key distribution, with the help from mobile nodes, in [45].
A technique taking advantage of heterogeneous networks was proposed in [44]. An
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agent-based trust and reputation management scheme (ATRM) was introduced and
evaluated in [7]. In [25], an on-demand public key management (OPKM) public key
management scheme was proposed. The OPKM scheme makes use of broadcasting
technology and digital signature for on-demand key management service.
Even when trust management is in place, it is still challenging for wireless nodes
to retrieve and distribute trust evidence. This is because many wireless networks such
mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs) are self-organized with vulnerable links. Flooding
is a simple and straight-forward method to send out queries toward the certificate
nodes. There have been many works trying to improve flooding efficiency. Cheng and
Heinzelman [11] designed an optimal flooding strategy minimizing cost and latency
for target discovery, although large amount of querying traffic and potential collisions
will be generated, especially with multiple queries. Similar approaches were taken
in peer-to-peer systems due to the similarities between such networks and ad hoc
networks. For example, Passive Distributed Indexing(PDI) [26], based on peer-to-
peer technology, addresses the file sharing problem in mobile scenarios by eliminating
the need of flooding to the entire network.
Power consumption is yet another important issue. Many strategies for cache
management have been proposed and studied with the objective of minimizing en-
ergy consumption and balancing network load. Barbara and Imielinski [5] proposed
three strategies that use invalidation reports and a stateless server. Broadcasting
Timestamps (BT) technique allows clients to report timestamp of each cached item
to server which, in turn, updates timestamp or purges cached items according to
report. In Amnesic Terminals (AT) strategy, the server actively informs nodes the
identifiers of the items that changed since the last invalidation report. SIG is the
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third technique that focuses on a new protocol between server and clients by signing
a set of cached items instead of just one item.
Jin and Wang [18] argued that demand-driven proportional strategy for replication
is far from optimal in 2-D mesh. They proposed an optimal strategy that replicates
an object such that the number of its replicas is proportional to p0.667, where p is the
access probability of the object in multi-hop wireless mesh networks. In [30], Nugge-
halli et al. addressed the issue of energy-conscious cache placement in wireless ad hoc
networks. While caching of information stored at the server on several distributed
nodes can improve information access delay, the energy consumption can be much
higher due to the delivery of such information to the caching locations. A polynomial
time algorithm was designed to compute the sub-optimal caching locations [30]. In
this paper, however, we are interested in the problem of lowering query overhead in
mobile wireless networks.
The problem we are focusing on shares many similarities with data dissemination
in wireless networks [15,52]. In fact, the certificate information we discuss in this work
can be any other information that is needed throughout the network. Data caching
can be used to improve the availability of essential information in the network [19,
22,48,52]. Besides, we take the jamming attack at MAC layer into consideration.
2.3 Jamming Detection at MAC Layer
Due to nature of wireless communication, openness, and sharing of physical medium,
it is relatively easy for malicious nodes in the network to launch jamming radio signal
to disrupt normal operation of network. Xu et al. [49] examined the radio interfer-
ence attack problem and categorized four jamming attack models: constant jammer,
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deceptive jammer, random jammer, and reactive jammer. They further designed two
schemes to detect jamming attacks by employing empirical methods based on signal
strength.
At MAC layer, the randomness of random access protocols (such as IEEE 802.11
medium access control) allows misbehaving or malicious nodes to gain priority to ac-
cess the shared medium after deviating their behavior from normal operation [4,24,39].
In Raya et al.’s paper [36], they found that greedy nodes making a slight modification
to some parameters defined in 802.11 standard protocol could substantially increase
the chance of channel occupation. The following two categories were classified: one is
greedy nodes sending out selectively scrambled frames to increase victim’s contention
window, which gives rise to collision occurrence on victim’s side that is supposed
to received RTS, CTS, and ACK packets; the other is nodes manipulating protocol
parameters to increase bandwidth share by transmitting after SIFS instead of DIFS,
assigning large value to NAV, and reducing back-off time. A detection mechanism
was designed but its effectiveness could deteriorate if its existence is known to the
attacker.
Radosavac et al. [32,33] concentrated security issues on malicious nodes choosing
not to comply to standard protocol by selecting small back-off interval in order to ob-
tain more shares of the channel over honest and normal nodes. Through modeling ob-
servation of sequence measurements of back-off interval used by malicious node, they
adopt minimax robust detection approach with objective to optimize performance
for the worst-case situations. Furthermore, they presented a method to decrease the
number of required samples in the minimax robust detection approach. Therefore,
observing node could arrive at a decision as soon as possible. Unfortunately, these
16
techniques only work for back-off interval maneuvering attacks.
Assigning large value to Network Allocation Vector (NAV) is another way that a
malicious node could use to lower channel utilization. As pointed out in Bellardo and
Savage’s paper [6], attackers could fabricate certain control packets with large value
in duration field in order to reserve the channel for a long period of time. This is
because normal nodes that received such control packets would have to update their
NAV variable and be quiet. They proposed to place a limit on the duration field in
order to mitigate the effect of such attacks. This would work for attacks of changing
the NAV values on RTS and ACK frames, but not for CTS frame. This is because
the hidden nodes from the data sender could not overhear the RTS frame and have
no way of limiting the values for NAV on a subsequent CTS frame. In this paper,
we present an approach to allow even hidden nodes to distinguish unsolicited CTS
frames from legitimate ones, with the help of two-hop neighbor information.
Other solutions have also been investigated. Ray et al. [35] explained the false
blocking problem from RTS/CTS mechanism in IEEE 802.11, which would not only
propagate to entire network, but also give rise to deadlock situations. To solve this,
they presented RTS validation approach to allow nodes receiving RTS packets defer a
small period of time ending at the time when corresponding DATA packet is supposed
to begin, instead of deferring the longer period specified in the duration field. Zhang
et al. [53] studied jamming ACK attack, which has two advantages to attacker, low
energy consumption for attacker and great damage to victim. The size of ACK packet
is short and it consumes small amount of energy. An Extend NAV schema (ENAV)
scheme was proposed to extend the ACK transmission window from TACK to R·TACK ,
which reduces the chance of collision between normal ACK packet and fabricated ACK
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packet. Chen et al. [10] proposed NAV validation approach to check that a subsequent
packet will be received at certain time. For instance, DATA frame should be received
within RTS_DATAHEAD_Time after RTS. Similarly, ACK frame is supposed to
be received within CTS_ACK_Time after CTS packet. However, malicious nodes
switching between CTS and ACK packet could avoid detection.
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CHAPTER III
SCHEME DESIGN
In this section, we now elaborate on two solutions, which improve the efficiency
of searching for certificate and beat the impact of CTS jamming attack respectively,
and their vital parts in great details
3.1 Evidence Distribution Based on Periodic Broadcast (EDPB)
Overview
Trial pheromone is a secreted chemical substance that laid on trials by ants when
they bring food back to their nest. It attracts other ants and serves as a guide to get
food. As more and more ants take the same route, they too lay pheromone, further
amplifying concentration of pheromone and attractiveness of the trial.
We treat this pheromone’s feature as a data structure on each node in our scheme
to guide query packets toward target. Similarly to the evaporation of ant’s pheromone,
traces should degrade as time elapses. This fits mobile networks nicely because route
information could become outdated with time.
Table 1. Pheromone Evidence Table
N1 N2 ..... Nm
Cert1 p11 p12 ..... p1m
Cert2 p21 p22 ..... p2m
... ... ... ..... ...
Certn pn1 pn2 ..... pnm
Every node stores a data structure called Pheromone Evidence Table (PET),
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which serves as a guide for local decision making. Each entry records pheromone
concentration for a known certificate. In network routing, pheromone concentration
is basically a probability value of reaching the certificate copy when the node is chosen
to forward the query packet.
In Table 1, we show an exampled PET table. This node has interacted with m
nodes, N1, N2, · · ·Nm and n certificate copies have been observed. Therefore, the
pheromone concentration of using node N1 to find certificate copy 1 is p11. Other
pheromone concentration values have similar meanings. These values will be updated
by backward ants (replying messages) and also be updated periodically to mimic the
pheromone evaporation process. They will be used when a forward ant (certificate
query message) tries to find a certificate copy. The details of these pheromones will
be explained in Section 3.1.
Our scheme is based on ant swarm intelligence, so we try to define different types
of packets as different ants. There are three types of ants: announcement ants,
forward ants, and backward ants. These ants represent announcement packets, query
packets, and response packets, respectively. We briefly explain these ants below.
Further details will be provided in Section 3.1.
Announcement ants will travel from certificate nodes. These are actually control-
flooded broadcast packets that will only travel at most TTL hops away from the
senders.
Forward ants will be sent by source nodes or querying nodes, which try to find
certificate copies. These packets move hop-by-hop toward the targets, looking for
the requested certificate. Along the path, they will collect the identifiers of passed
nodes and travel time length. Intermediate nodes with PET information toward the
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requested certificate will route the forward ant toward the appropriate next-hop node,
but those without such information will broadcast the forward ant to all neighbors.
Therefore, forward ants are capable of self-duplication which explores all potential
paths toward the requested certificate.
Backward ants are returned by the certificate nodes, as replies to the forward ants.
They will be routed on the path from which the corresponding forward ant traveled.
Furthermore, backward ants carry the requested certificate information.
The acronyms of different ant packets are summarized in Table 2.
Table 2. Different Ant Packets
Acronym Details
BAA Broadcast Announcement Ant
BFA Broadcast Forward Ant
UFA Unicast Forward Ant
UBA Unicast Backward Ant
Algorithm Details
Our scheme can be divided into three phases: Announcement phase, Query phase,
and Response phase. While response phase usually follows query phase, the announce-
ment phase has its own schedule that is independent of the other two phases.
Announcement Phase
In the announcement phase, the certificate nodes make periodic announcements
of their existence in their neighborhood. This is the main difference of our scheme
with other previously proposed schemes such as [17]. We argue that such periodic
announcements update the PET table in the neighborhood of the certificate copies
especially in mobile networks and allow the forward ants to find a certificate copy
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more efficiently.
In contrast, other schemes rely on the broadcast technique to look for certificate
copy and keep track of the traces left by the backward ants. While such a technique
works well in static networks, mobile networks introduce a much more difficult prob-
lem: trace invalidity. Trace can become invalid quickly in mobile networks but the
trace degradation technique implemented might not be able to mimic the process
accurately.
The announcement will be made in the local neighborhood of each certificate
node. In particular, the announcement packets will be flooded to the TTL-hop of the
neighborhood. We argue that an appropriate TTL value will allow a majority of the
querying nodes to have access to updated traces. Obviously, a large TTL will generate
more overhead. However, a larger TTL may not always be better even we disregard
the extra cost that it introduces. This is because each certificate copy has a soft region
of nodes that should contact the certificate node for certificate information. Further
increasing TTL over this region size can only complicate the path selection process of
the forwarding nodes. We investigate the effect of different TTL values in Section 4.1.
Announcement packet also can forward to a subset of TTL-hop neighborhood, instead
of flooding to all the neighbor nodes. This subset nodes will be carefully chosen by
certain measures, like link quality, latency, and traffic load. Subsequently, a number of
path within TTL hop region are strengthen by laying intensive pheromone. Compare
to flooding announcement, this approach has lower overhead and is more efficient
to locate certificate node. However, the measure that affects subset nodes selection
depends on which concern the routing protocol attempts to address. We will leave
this approach as future work for designing a more specific routing protocol.
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The information carried by the announcement ants includes certificate identity,
announcement sequence number, TTL, etc. An illustrated packet format is provided
in Table 3.
Table 3. Announcement ant packet format
FIELDS REMARKS
seq_num_ announcement sequence number
len_ packet length
src_addr_ address of announcement node
cert_id_ carrying certificate identity
last_sender_ identifier of the previous sender
hop_count_ hop count from the certificate node
ttl_ time-to-live
We propose to use the following method to estimate the best interval for announce-
ments interval:
T (σ) =
k1
σ
+ k2α (III.1)
where σ reflects mobility, α is a random number generated between 0 and 1, and
k1, k2 are constants. For instance, k2 can be set to 5 seconds. The estimation of σ
will be discussed later. When σ is estimated accurately, more announcements will be
made in high mobility networks and fewer (or just one) announcement will be made
in static networks.
When announcement ants carrying certificate information is flooded to TTL-hop
region, the nodes overhearing this announcement will update pheromone trace on
local PET. Two updating rules can be used: one is called simple reinforcement [15]
23
rule, defined as
Pi(n) =
Pi(n− 1) + ∆p
1 + ∆p
Pj(n) =
Pj(n− 1)
1 + ∆p
j ∈ Nk, j 6= i (III.2)
where Nk is current node’s neighbor set, i is one of current node’s neighbor that
forwarded or sent out announcement ants. ∆p is defined as k/f(c) where k is a
positive number constant and f(c) is a non-decreasing function of cost c. Cost c
could be any parameter that reveals information of certificate, such as hop count from
current node to certificate node, energy consumed during transmission and available
bandwidth usage of the one-hop link etc.
The other updating rule is termed advanced reinforcement rule, which proportion-
ally distribute current node’s pheromone evidence to its neighbor node, according to
trust evidence metric (Mi,k). Mi,k could be any metric measurement among the cur-
rent node and one of its neighbors, such as energy consumed, traffic load experienced,
and distance etc.
Pi = Pk ·
Mi,k∑
j∈Nk
Mj,k (III.3)
where j is current node, and i is one of node j’s neighbor [15,17].
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Query Phase
A node requesting for a certificate copy initiates a query phase, in which a forward
ant is sent and intermediate nodes help to route the forward ant toward a certificate
copy.
The difference of regular packet routing and query phase is the self-duplication of
forward ants. We define two kinds of forward ants: Broadcast Forward Ants (BFAs)
and Unicast Forward Ants (UFAs). When a node receives a forward ant (be it a BFA
or a UFA), it will look at its PET table and decide whether to send out a BFA or
a UFA. Furthermore, if a UFA is to be sent, the receiver of the UFA will be chosen
based on the PET table stored on the sending node.
When a sending node cannot find any immediate neighbor with positive trace
toward the queried certificate copy, a BFA will be sent. Therefore, all immediate
neighbors will receive a copy of the forward ant (to process/forward). However, if
there exists at least one immediate neighbor with positive trace toward the queried
certificate, a UFA will be sent and the immediate neighbor with the highest pheromone
value on the PET table will be chosen to be the receiver of the UFA.
The logic behind such a strategy is rather straightforward: when no neighbors
know about the certificate copy, the sending node has no other choice but to send it to
every neighbor. When one or more neighbors have traces toward the certificate copy,
the neighbor with highest trace (pheromone) should be chosen to forward the query
message (the forward ant). It is this simply decision making based on PET (local
information) that leads to nodes behavior coordinately. Eventually, these cohesively
individual behaviors achieve global common goal that deliveries BFAs and UFAs to
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the requested certificate.
In addition, forward ants always carry the identifiers of the nodes that they pass
through. These information will be needed in the response phase, which is in charge of
sending the certificate information back to the querying node. However, information
carried on forward ants is not subject to identifiers of traversed node, it can be a
broad variety of information categories which depends on what concerns emphasized
on in designing routing protocol. For example, goodness value of link [12] and delay
contained in forward ants are designed for a routing protocol that could balance
network load; energy consumption and latency information carried [16] on forward
ants is for a both energy critical and latency critical network.
Care must be taken to remove forward ants running the network endlessly, either
through a loop or some mis-routes. In order to ensure this behavior, a TTL value is
inserted in each forward ant generated by the querying node. Every node processing a
received forward ant will decrement the TTL value. When TTL reaches 0, the forward
ant will be purged from the network. Another approach to prevent loops is detecting
loop in the chain of identifiers of traversed nodes forward ant collected. Compare to
TTL approach, this approach is more accurate, but requires more computing resources
and times. Consider the limitation of resources, CPU speed and memory size in sensor
node and latency is one of performance metrics we will investigate in section 4.1, we
choose the TTL approach to prevent loops.
Response Phase
Once a forward ant reaches a certificate node, the response phase will be initiated.
In particular, a backward ant will be generated and sent back to the querying node.
There are two issues worth of discussion: the backward ant will use the informa-
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tion stored on the arriving forward ant; there might be more than one forward ant
arriving at the node carrying a certificate copy. Information collected from identifiers
of intermediate nodes is usually used to allow backward ant travel back to source
node along exactly same path as the original one. Other performance metrics infor-
mation memorized on forward ants, like latency, energy and link quality is a critical
factor for certificate node to release backward ant for certain arriving forward ants.
There are some strategies that certificate node can choose for sending out a number
of backward ants. Certificate node could replay with a backward ant for every each
arriving forward ant or release top-k backward ants with respect to certain perfor-
mance metrics by comparing all the arriving forward ants. In this work, the number
of response backward ant is same as the number of arrived forward ants since we
argue that every path could be a good quality path in a volatile context network.
In addition, each intermediate node will update its PET table using reinforcement
rules concerning the certificate copy and the node from which it receives the backward
ant. Similarly to the PET update in the announcement phase, two reinforcement rules
can be designed: one is simple reinforcement rule for fixed network that has been
discussed in the announcement phase; the other being the advanced reinforcement
rule proposed in [17] for mobile network, defined as:
Pi(t) =
[τi(t)]
α[η]β∑
j∈N
[τj(t)]
α[ηj]
β (III.4)
where ηi is the goodness value of the link between current node k and its neighbor
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node j. α and β are constants varied in different network environments and determined
usually by simulation. τi is the pheromone deposit, which is first defined in [17]:
τi(t+ ∆t) = f(τi(t),∆t) + ∆p (III.5)
τj(t+ ∆t) = f(τj(t),∆t) j ∈ N, j 6= i
where ∆p is the same as in (III.2). f(τi(t),∆t) is the pheromone evaporation function
defined as [17]
f(τi(t),∆t) = τi(t) · e−∆t·σ/k (III.6)
where σ is the same as in (III.1).
Equation (III.4) presents the formula for emulating the real pheromone evapora-
tion by making the pheromone evaporate over time to reduce the probability that
the packet forwards to outdated trails in mobile network. The speed of pheromone
evaporation is dynamically changed according to node’s mobility by mobility statis-
tics which records a set of mobility measures in a observation window. Node could
also dynamically make a switch between these two reinforcement rules by calculating
σ value out. A threshold value for σ, e.g. 0.2, in our simulation, could represent the
threshold to decide whether it is a static or mobile network.
3.2 Addressing inspection schema (AIS)
In this section, we introduce a countermeasure called address inspection schema
(AIS) to mitigate the effect of CTS jamming attack.
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Overview
First of all, we declare several notations that will be used throughout this work.
We define Nk as the neighbor set of node k. Furthermore, we use N ′k to represent
the two-hop neighbor set of node k, which can be computed by the union of neighbor
sets of node k’s neighbor nodes. So, N ′k =
⋃
j∈Nk
Nj.
The main idea of our AIS technique is to check the targeting address carried on the
CTS packets. With the help of two-hop neighborhood information, nodes can decide
whether the targeting address of a CTS packet is legitimate. This is because, except
in dynamic networks, all overheard CTS packets should have targeting addresses that
belong to the two-hop neighborhood set. This is true for each of the neighbors of
the CTS packet sender. The decision-making procedure for each node receiving or
overhearing CTS packet has the following phases:
Prerequisite phase: Node k sends out HELLO message carrying Nk to all its
neighbors so that other nodes can obtain their neighborhood information. This phase
should be performed periodically. It is important to ensure the freshness of N ′k.
Inspection phase: Node k inspects targeting address specified in the RA (Re-
ceiver Address) field of CTS packet. One of the following scenarios may arise
• I1: the targeting address is k and node k has sent an RTS packet. The CTS
packet is obviously legitimate. Node k proceeds with the normal operation;
• I2: the targeting address is k and node k has not sent an RTS packet. The
CTS packet is obviously illegitimate. Node k proceeds with the Clearance phase
below;
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• I3: the targeting address is not k and it belongs to the set N ′k. The CTS packet
could be legitimate. Node k proceeds with the normal operation, i.e., updating
NAV;
• I4: the targeting address is not k and it does not belong to the set N ′k. The
CTS packet is illegitimate. Node k ignores the CTS packet.
Clearance phase: In this phase, node k sends out a control packet, termed
Clear Reservation (CR), to instruct neighbor nodes to ignore the channel reservation
from previous CTS control packet. All nodes overhearing a CR message should ignore
the CTS packet, recover the original NAV value.
In order to be able to recover the original NAV value after fabricated CTS attack
detection, nodes overhearing CTS messages should not simply update their NAV val-
ues right away. Instead, they should keep a copy of the FCS of the CTS message and
record the current NAV value before updating it. When a CR message is overheard,
they will use these information to look for NAV value to recover.
Table 4. Packet format of the clear reservation control packet.
FIELDS BYTE REMARKS
frame control 2 control fields
TA 6 source address
FCS’ 4 FCS of the suspected CTS packet
FCS 4 FCS of this message
The information carried by CR packet includes frame control, identification of
previous CTS packet, source address, etc. Frame control field has the same structure
as illustrated in IEEE 802.11 specification, except one new value is introduced for
subtype field, CCTS, meaning clear previous CTS packet’s reservation. The FCS’
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field is copied from the FCS field in the fabricated CTS packet. This functions as
identification for the detected fabricated CTS message. A detailed CR packet format
is provided in Table 4.
Figure 1. A scenario illustrating fabricated CTS jamming detection. The network
is consisted of five nodes, a, b, c, k, and M . Node M is a malicious node sending
out CTS jamming packets randomly. If the targeting address of the fabricated CTS
packet from node M is a node outside of this neighborhood, e.g., node x, nodes b,
c, and k will detect the jamming and ignore the CTS packet. If node M sends a
fabricated CTS targeting at node k, then node k detects it and broadcasts a CR
message to notify node c (note that node b is still suffered from the attack). If node
M sends a fabricated message to node a, node b detects it and ignores the CTS
message (note that node k cannot detect the jamming message).
An illustrative example is provided in Fig. 1. Under different attack methods, the
neighboring nodes, if not all, will detect such fabricated CTS messages and clear the
channel reservation.
Detection Analysis
We have the following analysis regarding to the AIS operation.
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Incomplete Detection: As can be seen from the previous discussions, under
some attacks, only some neighbors will detect the attack and ignore the fabricated
CTS message. Other nodes will still be forced to be silent. This should not have
significant impacts on the throughput recovery of the AIS scheme: with some of the
nodes in the neighborhood ignoring the fabricated CTS message, they are free to send
out channel request or data transmission, occupying the channel instead wasting it
for idle. This beats the purpose of the attack.
Communication Overhead: There are two types of additional/revised packets
that need to be transmitted: HELLO messages containing each node’s neighbor list
and the CR message. The HELLO messages are usually broadcast periodically even
without the AIS scheme. We only modify the HELLO message to include the neighbor
list of the message sender, so that the neighbors can gather information about two-hop
neighbors. Note that such information may require some time to obtain.
The CR message will be sent by the node whose ID serves as the targeting address
on the fabricated CTS packets. This message is only sent when the node is under
attack. As we explained in the Introduction section, we assume that fabricating source
address is difficult for attacker (with radio fingerprinting technique in place [14]). Only
the node with ID as the targeting address on a suspected CTS message can send a
CR message.
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CHAPTER IV
EXPERIMENTATION AND EVALUATION
To avoid interaction of performance of two schemes, this section evaluates each of
them by setting separate environment.
4.1 EDPB Experiment
Experiment Setup
In order to study the characteristics and evaluate the performance of EDPB, we
have set up simulation experiment using NS2. A total of N = 300 nodes are uniformly
distributed in a field of 3000 × 3000 meters. The transmission range is 250 meters and
the data rate of the wireless channel is 2 Mbps. Our experiment proceeds in rounds.
In the beginning, several nodes are randomly selected to carry the certificate. Then
some other nodes are chosen to request the certificate information. All results are the
average of 20 runs.
We simulate two types of networks, static and mobile networks. In static networks,
nodes never move. In mobile networks, however, the nodes move at a speed randomly
chosen from 0 to a maximum speed, V .
Performance Metrics
Our evaluations focus on two major metrics: cost and latency. Cost is defined as
the total number of ant packets transmitted due to each certificate query. Since packet
transmission is proportional to energy consumption, such a cost also represents the
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energy cost to query the certificate. The second major metric that we will investigate
is latency. Latency is defined as the elapsed period between the time when a querying
node sends out the query and the time when the result comes back.
We placed λ copies of the same certificate in the network and querying nodes
send their requests subsequently looking for a certificate node. More advanced cache
placement techniques can be used [28], but are considered out of the scope of this work.
Unless specified otherwise, our simulations were based on the following parameters.
10 queries from different nodes are sent in each simulation. All simulation results are
the average of 20 runs with different seeds.
In mobile networks, we further investigate success ratio, defined as the number of
queries that actually find a certificate node divided by the total number of queries.
This metric represents the robustness of an evidence distribution scheme against
network dynamics. Another metric that we investigate is redundancy, measured as
the number of backward ants that each query triggers. As mentioned in section 3.1
and 3.1, one forward ant could duplicate itself as it searches toward the certificate
node. Therefore, more than one forward ant in the same query may reach the cer-
tificate node eventually, triggering multiple backward ants. Such a measurement can
represent the unnecessary cost for a query.
Static Networks
We first investigate the cost of ant packets transmitted in static networks. The
simple reinforcement rule (see (III.2)) is employed in both the announcement phase
and response phase. k = 0.5 and f(c) is defined as the number of hops from the
certificate node.
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Figure 2. The total number of ant packets, Na, which includes forward ants (BFA
and UFA), backward ants, and announcement ants (in our EDPB scheme). We com-
pared Na of ABED and EDPB in static networks. The Na value of EDPB is consis-
tently lower than that of ABED.
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The total number of ant packets, Na, is presented in Fig. 2. There is λ = 1
certificate node randomly placed in the network. We showed the results as a function
of time. In particular, we defined epoch as the interval in which one query is sent.
As can be observed in Fig. 2, EDPB has much lower Na values than ABED. This is a
direct result from the announcement phase, which announces the topological location
of the certificate nodes. Such information avoids the costly transmission of BFAs,
which will be sent when the sender has no preferred forwarding node.
The overall trend of Na as a function of time is decreasing over time. This can be
explained by the additional traces left by the backward ants. Hence all later queries
are more likely to take advantage of these traces and avoid sending BFAs. There is
a surprising upward trend in ABED’s Na numbers in the first three queries. These
might have been caused by the training nature of the first few queries in swarm
intelligence.
In order to investigate the effect of leaving traces (pheromone) on nodes’ PETs,
we investigated and compared the numbers of different ants being transmitted in the
EDPB scheme in a simulation of 200 seconds with 100 queries sent from randomly
chosen nodes.
Figure 3 presents our simulation results on the numbers of different types of ants.
As expected, the number of BAAs remains the same throughout the simulated period,
confirming the strategy of periodic announcement from the certificate nodes. It is
more interesting to compare the numbers of BFAs and UFAs. Our first observation
is that the number of UFAs are much higher than the number of BFAs, meaning that
more query packets are sent as unicast instead of being broadcasted. This is due to
the periodic broadcast announcements from the certificate nodes. As a number of
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reference, the number of UFAs is about 3 times as large as that of BFAs. The second
observation between the numbers of BFAs and UFAs is that they both decrease as
time passes on, except for a bump in the number of UFAs around 80 seconds. The
bump might have been caused by some unfortunate querying nodes. The overall
decreasing trend confirms that the traces from UBAs and BAAs are working.
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Figure 3. The number of different ant packets, BAA, BFA, UFA, and UBA. We
want to observe the change of different ants being sent in the network as time goes
on (with more and more traces or pheromone left on the PETs).
The number of UBAs is roughly the same as the number of BFAs, with a similar
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decreasing trend as time passes on. Therefore, as more and more queries are being
sent and processed throughout the network, the PETs tables are collecting traces
toward the certificate nodes. Hence, fewer and fewer forward ants will reach the
certificate nodes and fewer number of backward ants will be sent back as responses.
 0.05
 0.1
 0.15
 0.2
 0.25
 0.3
 0.35
 0.4
 0.45
 0.5
 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10
D
e
la
y
 T
im
e
Time [epoch]
ABED
EDPB
Figure 4. Query delays, T , of the ABED and EDPB schemes in static networks.
The query delay is defined as the overall time that a query spent in the network.
Neglecting the processing delays at the querying node and the certificate node, T is
the sum of forward ant travel time and UBA travel time in the network. We can see
that the query delay of the EDPB scheme is lower than that of the ABED scheme.
We further investigated query delay, T , of the ABED and EDPB schemes in static
networks. The network setup is similar to that of Fig. 3. The query delay is defined as
the overall time that a query spent in the network. Neglecting the processing delays
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at the querying node and the certificate node, T is the sum of forward ant travel
time and UBA travel time in the network. As can be seen from Fig. 4, the query
delay of the EDPB scheme remains at 0.15 second for all the queries that we tested.
The query delay of the ABED scheme, however, fluctuates a lot as the numbers of
BFAs and UFAs change between different queries. The initial increase of query delays
in the ABED scheme might have been caused by more and more ant packets being
transmitted in the network. Subsequently, as more and more traces are stored on
PET tables, the query delay is shorter.
Mobile Networks
Node mobility could quickly invalidate the pheromone trace on PET tables. How-
ever, with the help from our periodic announcements, the PET tables will remain
accurate and allow forward ants to locate certificate nodes quickly. We evaluated our
scheme and the ABED scheme in different mobile networks in this section.
Our simulations used periodic announcements in (III.1), with a = 1 and σ = 0.5,
which is proportional to actually mobility. We borrowed the concept of σ from Sub-
ramanian et al. in [43]. In their mobility statistics, σ is the variance of trip times. In
our implementation, we estimate the trip times as the transmission delays for forward
and backward ants over a moving observation window. The advanced reinforcement
rule is used when backward ants are received, as defined in (III.4). α = 1 and β = 2,
and σ is set to 0.5. The announcement ants will still be processed with the simple
reinforcement rule. We leave the further investigation of these reinforcement rules as
future work.
The success ratios of the ABED and the EDPB schemes are compared in Fig. 5,
39
under various mobility. The mobility is demonstrated with the maximum speed from
which each node chooses its actual speed of movement. From this figure, we can see
that the ABED scheme has a quickly degrading success ratio as network mobility
increases. For example, when the maximum speed is 15 m/s, the success ratio of
the ABED scheme is about 0.1. On the other hand, the EDPB scheme enjoys high
success ratio even under high mobility. Note that the success ratio of 0.9 in low
mobility network could be due to a response timeout in the first query.
 0
 0.1
 0.2
 0.3
 0.4
 0.5
 0.6
 0.7
 0.8
 0.9
 1
 0  2  4  6  8  10  12  14  16  18
S
u
c
c
e
s
s
 R
a
ti
o
Maximum speed of moving nodes, v [m/s]
EDPB
ABED
Figure 5. Success ratio of the ABED and the EDPB schemes. Success ratio is defined
as the ratio between the number of queries that eventually locate certificate nodes
and the total number of queries. The ABED scheme suffers from the low success ratio
problem. On the other hand, the EDPB scheme maintains a success ratio of 0.8 and
0.9 even under high mobility.
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Figure 6. Hop-count comparison of the ABED and EDPB schemes in mobile net-
works. We measured the hop-counts that each of the response packets traveled. This
represents the scheme’s capability of finding the shortest path between the querying
node and the closest certificate node.
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In Fig. 6, we compared the hop-count that each of the response packets (backward
ants) traveled. Such a value represents the quality of the identified paths. The EDPB
scheme offers better hop-count than the ABED scheme, even though some fluctuations
can be observed. The gap between EDPB line and ABED line shows that our EDPB
scheme can find the shorter path than ABED scheme does. The reason behind this is
pheromone laid by announcement packets significantly leads forward ant that arrives
at the edge of announcement area to find the shortest path to certificate node, whereas
forward ants in ABED have to explore possible paths in which detour path exists.
In Fig. 7, we compared the delay performance of the ABED and EDPB schemes.
The simulation setup was similar to that of Fig. 4. Nodes moved at a speed randomly
chosen from 0 to 2 m/s. We only measured the shortest delay for each query. We can
see that the EDPB scheme has consistently shorter delay than the ABED scheme.
In fact, the EDPB scheme enjoys a short delay of about 0.1 second, but the ABED
scheme has up to seconds of delay. This is because of the additional transmissions in
the ABED scheme, searching for the certificate copies. The extra delay could have
also been caused by the outdated trace on PETs that lead the forward ants toward
the wrong location. Once the forward ants reach the location, they will have to be
re-routed in search of the certificate nodes, causing more collisions and delay.
In Figure 8, we compared the redundancy of the ABED and the EDPB schemes.
The redundancy represents the overall number of backward ants returning to the
querying node in each query. We can observe that the EDPB scheme has lower
redundancy as compared to the ABED scheme. The fluctuation of redundancy in
the ABED scheme can be explained by the sometimes lack of valid trace toward
the certificate nodes at some locations. The broadcast announcement in the EDPB
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scheme allows the nodes in the neighborhood of the certificate nodes to store valid
traces toward them.
To further evaluate the EDPB scheme, we have investigated its delay performance
under different broadcast announcement intervals. The results are shown in Fig. 9.
As the announcement interval increases, the delay increases. This is expected: with
longer announcement intervals, fewer announcements are made, making the traces on
the PET tables less accurate. An extreme case is to use an very long announcement
interval in mobile network, representing the EDPB with just one or no announce-
ments.
4.2 AIS Experiment
Experiment Setup
order to study the characteristics and evaluate the performance of AIS, we set up
simulation experiments using NS2. The wireless transmission range is 250 meters.
One node is put into the network serving as the attacker which would periodically
send out CTS jamming packets.
We simulated two different types of attacking strategies for the attacker: one
targets at non-existing node address, which is termed as “Blind Fabricated CTS” or
“Blind FCTS”; the other targets at random node address, which is termed “Focus
Fabricated CTS”, or “Focus FCTS”.
Then, we carried out simulation for the following four scenarios.
• normal: network under no FCTS attacks and the AIS;
• Blind FCTS: network under Blind FCTS attacks but without AIS running;
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• Blind FCTS + AIS: network under Blind FCTS attacks and AIS is running;
• Focus FCTS + AIS: network under Focus FCTS attacks and AIS is running.
Unless specified otherwise, all remaining parameters used in simulations are listed
in Table 5. The attack period is the duration for each FCTS packet and the attack
interval is the interval between two consecutive attacks.
Table 5. Simulation Parameters
Simulation 25 sec. Routing Protocol AODV
Attack Start Time 8th sec. AIS Start Time 13th sec
Attack Period 6 msec. Attack Interval 7 msec.
CBR data rate 120Kb CBR packet size 100 bytes
Performance Metrics
Our evaluations focus on two major metrics: throughput and delivery ratio.
Throughput is defined as the total traffic transmitted in network. Throughput can be
considered as the indicator of network functionality. Note that the throughput pre-
sented here is the so-called “instant throughput”, which measures the instantaneous
throughput, or the number of bits transmitted/received successfully in a unit time.
The second major metric that we investigate is delivery ratio, defined as the
number of received packets at the receiver divided by the number of transmitted
packets. This represents the success ratio of actual transmission.
Performance Evaluation
We first present the results of a pre-assigned network, in which a total of N = 12
regular nodes are placed in a field of a 500 × 500 meters. The attacker locates at
the center of the network. As Fig. 10 shows, without attacker in network, the data
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transmission is stable, and overall trend of transmission stays at a horizontal level.
However, when the Blind FCTS attack is introduced, throughput drops to almost 0,
starting from the 8th second, which is the attack starting time. This is because the
sender is forced to be silent after the Blind FCTS attack.
However, with the help from AIS, victim nodes would ignore illegitimate channel
reservation from the attacker, this is demonstrated by two curves in Fig. 10, “Blind
FCTS + AIS” and “Focus FCTS + AIS”. After the AIS scheme is activated at 13th
second, the throughput curves quickly climb up and approach stable throughput. For
Blind FCTS attacks, AIS allows every node to detect such attacks and ignore the
corresponding NAV reservations. Based on Fig. 10, the last part of “Blind FCTS +
AIS” curve is very close to the curve of the normal network, showing that the network
has recovered the throughput to original level.
For Focus FCTS attacks, AIS could only recover a majority of the throughput since
attacker alternated targeting address randomly. This could be observed in Fig. 10,
i.e., the gap in the stable throughput region between “Focus FCTS + AIS” curve and
“Blind FCTS + AIS” curve. The reason for such a gap is the detection failure by the
AIS scheme (such as the failed detection by node k when node M sends an FCTS
message to node a). In addition, we could observe that the lowest point of “Focus
FCTS + AIS” curve is around 20, which is different from that of “Blind FCTS +
AIS” scenario. The protection described in IEEE 802.11 standard could explain such
a phenomenon: when a node receives unexpected CTS packet targeting to itself, it
will discard this packet and is free to use the channel later on.
We also simulated our scheme in a network where N = 40 nodes are placed
randomly in a region of 1200 × 1200. We selected more sender-receiver pairs in order
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to observe the effect of attack and AIS in a network with higher traffic load.
In Fig. 11, we present delivery ratio results in normal, Blind FCTS only, Blind
FCTS plus AIS and Focus FCTS plus AIS networks. The results were obtained
through stable conditions, i.e., no dynamic behavior by the attacker or AIS during
the observing window. In normal network, overall trend of delivery ratio stays at a
high level, and drops slightly at the end, caused by the heavy traffic load. Delivery
ratio in Blind FCTS only network is about 0.22 with low traffic load. Seemingly
surprisingly, it rises to 0.28 as the traffic load increases. This can actually be explained
by the additional pairs of communications, some of which might not be jammed by
the attacker.
Networks with AIS running maintain a high delivery ratio, dropping slightly with
heavy traffic load. This shows that the use of the AIS technique allows nodes to
detect the FCTS attacks and are free to use the channel.
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Figure 7. Delay comparison of the ABED and the EDPB schemes in mobile net-
works. The nodes move at a speed randomly chosen between 0 and 2 m/s. We
measure the delay as the time when the querying node sent out the forward ant and
the time when the backward ant returns. It can be seen that the EDPB scheme offers
much lower and consistent delay than the ABED scheme does.
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Figure 8. Redundancy comparison between the ABED and the EDPB schemes in
mobile networks. Redundancy is defined as the number of backward ants returning to
each of the query packet (or forward ant sent by the querying node). This performance
metric represents the overall redundancy or unnecessary transmission in the network
when nodes are searching for certificate nodes. The optimum value should be 1 but
in practice, it can take values higher than 1.
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Figure 9. Delay performance of the EDPB scheme under different broadcast an-
nouncement intervals. The different legends represent such different intervals. It can
be seen that the delay generally increases with the interval.
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Figure 10. Throughput performance in normal, Blind FCTS only, Blind FCTS plus
AIS and Focus FCTS plus AIS networks. Jamming attack starts at 8th second. AIS
kicks in at 13th second. As we can see, AIS helps network to restore most portion of
original transmission when network is under attack.
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CHAPTER V
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORKS
In an asymmetric cryptography wireless network, it is a huge challenge for nodes to
search for trust certificate efficiently while the network is exposed to attacks violating
IEEE 802.11 standard. In this work, we have investigated two of these problems and
proposed two effective solutions, Evidence Distribution based on Periodic Broadcast
(EDPB) and address inspection schema (AIS).
EDPB allows querying nodes to locate requested information more quickly and
efficiently both in static and dynamic network. EDPB not only takes advantages
inherited from swarm intelligence, such as local information possession that does not
cause extra overhead of interaction with environment and lowered transmission num-
ber in network, but also makes essential announcements that leave trace information
on those potentially optimal paths which can yield better performance in cost and
delay. This scheme can be used for data dissemination and query in other mobile
wireless networks such as vehicular networks. Instead of searching for certificate,
other essential data or information can be queried.
In the future, EDPB can be improved by comparison with other state-of-the-art
schemes and be implemented it on mobile devices for field tests. Theoretical analysis
of the optimum TTL and pheromone update rules can be beneficial as well.
AIS helps nodes distinguish legitimate CTS packets from fabricated ones by using
the help of tow-hop neighborhood information and inspecting the targeting address on
the CTS packet. When such targeting address falls within the two-hop neighborhood
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of the attacker, some nodes in the network will be able to detect the attack and ignore
the illegitimate claim of channel reservation. AIS simulations showed that jamming
attack could be easily distinguished, and a significant portion of network throughput
can be recovered.
In our future work, we will investigate the jamming attack in mobile networks and
evaluate the performance of our proposed scheme in such networks. An approach of
delayed action can be used: only after detecting a fabricated CTS message a few times
will a node ignore the NAV value from the message. This will provide extra protection
for communication of mobile nodes. Theoretical analysis of the performance of our
scheme will be performed as well. Furthermore, the overhead of two-hop neighborhood
information will be investigated in different networks.
At the final step of future work, we will combine these two solutions in a complex
scenario so that distributed trust evidence can be searched with low cost and delay
while the effects of CTS jamming attack can be mitigated.
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